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ABSTRACT
The developmental precursors of the “fully fun-
ctioning person” (Rogers) have not received 
much systematic attention neither in psycho-
logical research nor in theories of personali-
ty and its development. Likewise, the develop-
mental conditions for maladaptive personality
functioning and the formation of psychologi-
cal symptoms have not been the primary tar-
get of research in clinical psychology during 
the past decades (Castonguay, 2011). On the 
basis of a theory of personality that specifi es 
a functional architecture of personality (i.e., 
personality systems interactions theory: PSI 
theory) developmental pathways are descri-
bed that promote successful or impaired de-
velopment of the integrated self which plays
a pivotal role in PSI theory. Adaptive develop-
mental pathways are described in terms of the 
developmental conditions promoting the abi-
lity to initiate unattractive instrumental acti-
vities (action control) and the integration of 
self-alien and painful experiences into an ever
growing personal knowledge base (self-deve-
lopment). Maladaptive pathways are proposed 
to describe the developmental conditions for 
two major forms of psychological disorders: 
symptoms related to impaired action control 
(e.g., procrastination, eating disorders, de-
pression) and symptoms related to impaired 
self-growth (e.g., rigidity, failure to learn from 
mistakes, psychosomatic symptoms).
Any theory of personality should be able 
to explain adaptive and maladaptive forms 
of personality development. However, this is-
sue does not belong to the prime targets of 
research efforts made in personality, devel-
opmental, or clinical psychology. Instead, 
competing hypotheses are derived from glo-
bal constructs such as self-effi cacy, irration-
al thinking, poor self-esteem and the like. 
Typical questions arising from this global-
construct approach are: Does a man who has 
problems initiating simple activities at home
(despite his effi cient performance at his work) 
suffer from impaired self-effi cacy, poor self-
esteem, or does he simply have chauvinistic 
attitudes against his wife? Global constructs 
are also offered by the two major schools of 
thinking in psychology: From a psychoana-
lytic point of view, a woman’s overeating may 
be caused by an “oral regression” which dic-
tates her behavior to eat as impulsively as oral 
needs drive baby’s feelings during the oral 
stage of development? In contrast, behavior-
istic learning theory would attribute those and 
other symptoms such as disturbed sleep, im-
paired immune function and stress-depend-
ent pain like headache or backpain to the ac-
quisition of irrational thinking or maladaptive 
behaviors that can be remedied by rewarding 
more appropriate behaviors.
Key words: affect regulation, depression, de-
velopmental psychopathology, eating disor-
ders, mental health, personality functioning, 
procrastination, psychosomatic symptoms, 
self-development, self-regulation 
Adaptive and Maladaptive Pathways
of Self-Development: Mental Health and Interactions 
Among Personality Systems1
JULIUS KUHL 
University of Osnabrück
Germany
10 Julius Kuhl
INTRODUCTION
In the initial stages of scientifi c psychology, 
the search for the developmental origins of 
psychological health and illness had generated 
diverse explanatory approaches, notably those
stemming from the two major schools of thin-
king, that is psychoanalysis and (cogniti-
ve) behaviorist approaches (Blatt, Auerbach, 
Levy, 1997; Castonguay, 2011; First, Tasman, 
2004; Hollon, Beck, 2005). In this article
I would like to explore the extent to which the 
state of the art accomplished in personality 
psychology can make a contribution to a bet-
ter understanding of mental health and the ad-
vancement of adaptive and maladaptive perso-
nality development. I will start with a critical 
discussion of the limitations of current appro-
aches to personality and explain a new theory 
of personality which suggests some new per-
spectives toward the mechanisms underlying 
self-development over a life span. I will apply 
this developmental model to explain the pre-
cursors of successful and impaired develop-
ment of self-competencies and its role in the 
etiology of psychological disorders. 
During the past 50 years or so, the contribu-
tion of personality psychology to a better un-
derstanding of mental illness has reached
a stage of diminishing returns. Why does the-
ory and research on personality have so little 
to say about the conditions for successful de-
velopment or about the causes underlying psy-
chological symptoms? One possible answer 
would be that the study of personality has fo-
cused on issues that do not have much relevan-
ce for some of the central questions related to 
healthy and disturbed personality functioning. 
In fact, for more than half a century a great 
portion of personality research has capitali-
zed on a method that might not have much po-
tential for answering questions about healthy 
or impaired personality functioning. The wel-
l-known story about Mullah Nasrudin can be
taken as a warning against choosing an easy, 
but suboptimal method over a diffi cult, but 
adequate strategy to reach one’s goal: When 
Nasrudin was looking for his lost key a man 
who had been helping him for a while in his 
desperate search asked him: “Don’t you re-
member where exactly you lost your key?” 
Nasrudin pointed down the street and said: 
“Down there, but I am searching here because 
I can see better under the street light.” 
Has personality psychology been search-
ing for answers in the wrong place because it 
happened to get a hold of a convenient meth-
od that prompted it to search there? Interest-
ingly, factor analysis has been used for more 
than fi ve decades to answer a question that 
seemed optimally suited for it: What are the 
basic categories or dimensions people use to 
describe themselves or others? However, is 
this the essential question for a scientifi c study 
of personality? And if so, is factor analysis 
the appropriate method to answer it? A brief 
refl ection about other sciences may provide
a clue to answer this question: Would we have 
a periodic table in chemistry, the genetic code 
in biology and quantum mechanics in physics 
if those sciences would have used a method 
like factor analysis which aggregates things 
that happen to go together when we observe 
them in the external world? Probably not: Sci-
entifi c progress has been made in the histo-
ry of science when elements that naturally go
together could be separated. Experimental dis-
sociation rather than descriptive aggregation 
has been the pathway toward a deeper under-
standing of nature. 
When I started my experimental stud-
ies into human motivation and personali-
ty some forty years ago I was surprised that 
the two fundamental questions that both com-
mon sense and psychological practitioners ex-
pected personality psychology to answer were 
not on the agenda of systematic experimental 
personality research. These two questions re-
late to volitional effi ciency (“action control” 
or “self-management”: Kanfer, 1970) and 
self-growth (Rogers, 1961). In order to an-
swer these questions it takes more than col-
lecting people’s judgments about themselves 
and others and aggregating them according 
to their natural co-occurrence. An alternative 
approach to personality gained momentum in 
the seventies and eighties of the last century. 
This approach focused on mental contents in 
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order to improve our understanding of per-
sonality. The rationale behind this approach 
may be illustrated by the following example: 
If you want to predict the itinerary of a travel-
ling salesman it seems better to fi nd out some-
thing about his preferences, beliefs and goals 
(i.e., mental contents) than taking the engine 
of his car apart or analyzing the functional 
components of his brain. However, the prob-
lem with this content-focused method is that
it often confounds prediction with explanation. 
Mental contents such as control beliefs (e.g., 
self-effi cacy) or goals do very well in predict-
ing behavior (Bandura, 1989; Locke, Latham, 
1990). However, as a method for explaining
the way personality works, the analysis of men-
tal contents is about as useful as the predic-
tion of a car’s speed on the basis of the inclina-
tion of the gas pedal is in helping us understand 
how the many parts of a car work together.
The theory of Personality Systems Inter-
actions (PSI theory) integrates diverse theo-
ries of personality and many fi ndings from ex-
perimental psychology and neurobiology and 
adds an essential feature which runs coun-
ter to most traditional and current approach-
es to personality: Instead of focusing on men-
tal contents such as beliefs, goals, intentions, as 
well as  emotional contents, PSI theory provides
a functional analysis of the mental systems 
and their interactions producing a given be-
havior. For example, when a student fails to 
do his homework, the common view would 
search for mental contents “explaining” this 
behavior by referring to his impaired control 
beliefs (low self-effi cacy), insuffi cient goal-
setting or his negative attitude and debilitating 
emotions (e.g., anxiety). The functional analy-
sis provided by PSI theory adds an additional 
level of explanation to the content level: The 
homework-avoiding student may even have 
the right mental content (i.e., the intention to 
fi nish homework or a fi rm belief that he can 
do it), but for some reason the memory system 
which keeps reminding him of his uncomplet-
ed intention (i.e., intention memory) cannot 
make contact with the system which controls 
the necessary behavior. In the following sec-
tion I will provide a brief summary of PSI the-
ory that will to pave the way for the fi nal sec-
tion explaining the developmental conditions 
of psychological symptoms such as procras-
tination, messy behavior, eating disorders and 
stress-dependent psychosomatic symptoms on 
the basis of disturbed interactions among per-
sonality systems.
THE THEORY OF PERSONALITY 
SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS (PSI)
According to the fi rst modulation assumption 
of PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), the interac-
tion between intention memory and the beha-
vior control system can be intensifi ed by po-
sitive affect (see the diagonal arrow “action 
control” in Figure 1). Therefore, the deeper re-
ason why our student often fails to fi nish his 
homework may be found in his inability to ge-
nerate positive affect which is necessary to 
enact his intention (i.e., the student may suffer 
from impaired “self-motivation”). As a result, 
development of action control, that is growing 
effi ciency in enacting one’s intentions requires 
some “emotional dialectic”, that is an alterna-
tion between the ability to tolerate the loss
of positive affect for a while (which helps to 
maintain even diffi cult or unpleasant intentions 
active in memory) and subsequent genera-
tion of positive affect (e.g., through self-moti-
vation) to be able to enact the intention (Figu-
re 1). Direct empirical evidence for this fi rst 
modulation assumption of PSI theory stems 
from fi ndings showing that volitional effi cien-
cy (i.e., action control) can be substantially in-
creased when the shift toward positive affect 
is experimentally facilitated through exter-
nal cues, for example, through positive affec-
tive primes presented before a diffi cult self-
regulatory task such as the Stroop task (Kuhl,
Kazén, 1999; Kazén, Kuhl, 2005) or through
having participants shift their attention be-
tween the anticipation of positive affect asso-
ciated with goal attainment and the tolerance 
of reduction of positive affect which is typi-
cally associated with the unpleasant sides of 
the immediate steps to be taken (Oettingen, 
Pak, Schnetter, 2001).
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A second issue concerns the question why 
the performance of complex tasks deteriorates 
after people experience failure. Again, pre-
vailing explanations have focused on mental 
contents. For example, performance defi cits 
observed after exposure to uncontrollable fail-
ure (“learned helplessness”: Hiroto, Seligman, 
1975) have been attributed to a generalized 
belief in loss of control or to low perceived 
self-effi cacy (Abramson, Seligman, Teasdale, 
1978; Bandura, 1989). 
However, empirical fi ndings are not com-
patible with this view. The data suggest a pri-
mary functional defi cit which even occurs 
when impaired control beliefs do not gener-
alize to new tasks (Kuhl, 1981; Lewinsohn et 
al., 1981). This functional defi cit seems to re-
sult from an impairment of self-regulation in 
people who are not able to downregulate the 
negative affect elicited by a failure experience. 
According to the second modulation assump-
tion of PSI theory, excessive negative affect 
inhibits access to an extended network inte-
grating personally relevant experience (i.e., 
extension memory and the implicit self) and 
decouples this system from a low-level expe-
riential system (i.e., object recognition) which 
focuses on a single detail (i.e., an “object”) 
rather than the extended overview provided
by extension memory and the implicit self 
(Figure 1). Focusing on a single experience 
(i.e., an “object”) that cannot be integrated
into the extended experiential network can be 
regarded as the basis of uncontrollable rumi-
Figure 1. Cognitive systems of PSI Theory and their modulation by high (+) vs. low (–) positive (A+)
or negative (A–) affect. Note: 1. Dashed arrows indicate antagonisms between cooperating systems that 
can only be overcome through an affective change from the affect associated with the starting system to the 
affect associated with the target system.
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nation: When people are stuck in a negative 
emotional state (i.e., when they are “state-ori-
ented”), they cannot volitionally stop rumi-
nating about negative events because their 
negative affect over-activates the object rec-
ognition system. Uncontrollable rumination 
about details that are isolated from the full 
picture (including one’s extended experiential 
knowledge base, that is the self or “extension 
memory”) impairs the ability to learn from 
mistakes, that is to update one’s experiential 
system (which would require some contact 
between the failure experience reverberating 
throung the object recognition system and ex-
tension memory with its most important part: 
the implicit self). 
Self-development (i.e., the development of 
a mature self) requires the ability to learn from 
mistakes and to integrate painful experiences 
into an ever growing self system. According 
to PSI theory, this process is driven by anoth-
er form of emotional dialectics which operates 
along the negative axis: repeated shifts be-
tween a focus on some negative event or object 
(i.e., focusing on rather than repressing a mis-
take or a painful experience) and subsequent 
downregulation of negative affect to bring the 
negative event in contact with extension mem-
ory and help integrate the new experience into 
a growing intuitive knowledge base (see the 
diagonal arrow “self-growth” in Figure 1). 
Empirical evidence directly supporting 
this second modulation assumption (i.e., fa-
cilitated self-access as a function of downreg-
ulation of negative affect) stems from exper-
iments on self-infi ltration (Baumann, Kuhl, 
2003; Kuhl, Kazén, 1994): Under a condition
arousing negative affect, participants who are 
not able to downregulate it (i.e., “state orien-
ted” individuals) show an increased tenden-
cy to misattribute assigned tasks or options 
preferred by another person to their own 
choice (e.g., they remember activities as “self-
-chosen” even if those activities were suggest-
ed to them by an authority fi gure). Participants 
who are able to downregulate negative affect 
(i.e., action-oriented individuals) do not show 
this stress-dependent tendency toward false 
self-ascriptions of externally controlled activi-
ties. This fi nding is consistent with the second 
modulation assumption of PSI theory which 
states that excessive negative affect impairs 
self-access. Since the self can be understood 
as the integrated knowledge base derived from 
a huge variety of personal experiences, im-
paired self-access caused by exposure to aver-
sive events can explain both deteriorated in 
performance of complex tasks (Hiroto, Selig-
man, 1975; Kuhl, 1981) and stress-depend-
ent impaired discrimination between own and 
others’ choices (Kuhl, Kazén, 1994).
PSI theory not only describes the interac-
tions among the four systems comprising the 
“architecture of personality” as a function of 
continuous shifts among opposing emotion-
al states (i.e., between low and high positive
affect for action control and between high 
and low negative affect for self-development: 
Figure 1). In addition, the theory provides
detailed descriptions of the functional charac-
teristics of each of the four cognitive-behavio-
ral systems (i.e., intention and extension mem-
ory, object recognition and intuitive behavior 
control). The functional profi les of the four 
systems are based on experimental and neu-
robiological evidence related to explicit and 
implicit self-perception and explicit as well 
as implicit perception of the external world 
(Kuhl, 2001; Kuhl, Koole, 2008). 
An especially noteworthy example of the 
functional analysis provided by PSI theory 
concerns the integrated (implicit) self which 
plays a pivotal role in this theory. Its function-
al profi le is characterized by parallel-holistic 
rather than sequential-analytic processing up 
to the highest level of integration of personally 
relevant experience. The integrated self com-
bines this parallel processing with an intuitive 
and multidimensional (“polysemantic”) repre-
sentation of meaning (Baumann, Kuhl, 2002; 
Rotenberg, 2004) and a multidimensional in-
tegration of emotions and somatic markers 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, 2000; Wittling, 
1990). 
Besides the structural elements of PSI the-
ory (i.e., the four cognitive-behavioral systems 
plus reward and punishment systems modulat-
ing their interaction), additional features of the 
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theory relate to different forms of interactions 
among those systems. Two types of low-lev-
el control, two types of motivation, and two 
forms of high-level volition are of particular 
interest in the present context: The two types 
of low-level control are automatic and intui-
tive control. The common feature of automat-
ic or intuitive control is that neither requires 
the participation of the two high-level systems 
(i.e., intention or extension memory). An im-
portant difference between automatic and in-
tuitive control is that the former is more fo-
cused than the latter: A consciously perceived 
stimulus (processed in the object recognition 
system: Figure 1) can automatically elicit
a behavioral routine associated with it. In con-
trast, intuitive behavior control is guided by an 
implicit perceptual network (Goodale, Milner, 
1992) which provides parallel processing of
a wide variety of context information render-
ing behavior control extremely fl exible. 
The second distinction concerning systems 
interactions relates to approach versus avoid-
ance motivation. Automatic and intuitive con-
trol can operate without positive or negative 
affect (e.g., when I go to my offi ce in the morn-
ing, irrespective of whether or not I happen to 
feel like it). However, affectively charged in-
centives add emotional support to approach or 
avoidance oriented forms of intuitive or auto-
matic behavior, respectively. The two types 
of motivation mentioned earlier relate to this 
case: Avoidance motivation can operate at
a low level of processing (e.g., energizing 
fi ght or fl ight routines) or at a high level (e.g., 
using experiential knowledge from extension 
memory for accomplishing self-relaxation); 
likewise approach motivation can operate at
a low level (e.g., energizing consummatory 
behavior such as eating an apple or engaging 
in some habitual small talk) or at a high level
of processing (e.g., when personal meaning 
and self-congruence are involved). High lev-
el avoidance motivation entails self-confron-
tational rather than defensive coping (e.g., fo-
cusing on a diffi cult experience and talking 
about it rather than denying or embellishing 
it). High level approach motivation enables 
the individual to engage in instrumental activ-
ities that do not have successive positive va-
lence to energize behavior for their own sake 
(e.g., raising positive energy for an aversive 
task through self-motivation).
The third dichotomy concerning vari-
ous forms of interactions among psychologi-
cal systems involves volition: Self-control is 
a narrow form of control governed by inten-
tion memory and its narrow focus on one con-
scious intention at a time whereas self-regu-
lation is a wide (parallel) and fl exible form of 
largely unconscious regulation associated with 
the extended experiential network provided by 
the integrated self (Figure 1). The narrow vs. 
wide scope of processing associated with two 
modes of volition (i.e. self-control and self-
regulation) mirrors the narrow vs. wide focus 
of attention which is characteristic for the two 
modes of low-level processing (i.e., automatic 
versus intuitive behavior control).
How can we learn more about the function-
al profi les of the four epistemic systems de-
scribed in PSI theory? Neurobiological fi nd-
ings suggest a neuroanatomical basis of the 
functional profi les of the four personality sys-
tems. The relationship between functional and 
neuroanatomical distance is a useful heuristic 
in exploring possible implications of neuro-
biological fi ndings for developing a function-
al architecture of personality: The lower the 
neuroanatomical distance between two net-
works (i.e., the more closely they are located 
in the brain) the more likely it is that they form
a functional network of cooperating functional 
components, that is a “system” (Sporns et al.,
2004). Ipsilaterality is a special case of this 
general rule: When two functions share the 
same hemisphere they are more likely to 
form an effi cient functional unit compared
to two functions that cannot cooperate unless
a switch occurs from one hemisphere to the 
other (e.g., when a holistic experience sup-
ported by the right hemisphere is to be trans-
lated into propositional language generated in 
the left hemisphere). Does this neurobiologi-
cal principle of the relationship between func-
tional and neuroanatomical distance extend to 
personality dynamics? This seems to be the 
case: If the ipsilaterality hypothesis were cor-
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rect, one should be able to increase self-ac-
cess simply by activating any network within 
the right hemisphere. In fact, when the motor 
cortex of the right hemisphere is activated, the 
self-infi ltration effect, produced by defi cient 
self-access, disappears (Baumann, Kuhl, Ka-
zén, 2005). Conversely, when the right hem-
ispheric network supporting implicit self-per-
ception is activated the right-hemispheric side 
of the motor cortex is activated (Molnar-Sza-
kacs, Uddin, Iacoboni, 2005).
HEALTHY SELF-DEVELOPMENT
Since the general developmental implications 
of PSI theory have been elaborated elsewhere 
(Kuhl, Keller, 2008), I can focus here on some 
specifi c details related to the development of 
effi cient action control and successful self-
growth. How does healthy self-development 
come about? Presumably, interpersonal re-
sponsivity is a crucial condition for a healthy 
development of the self system. The cogni-
tive side of self-growth has been investiga-
ted in the context of children’s acquisition of 
a theory of mind (Fonagy et al., 2002; Wim-
mer, Perner, 1983; Wellman, Cross, Watson, 
2001) which seems to be closely related to the 
ability to take another person’s perspective,
a cognitive prerequisite for empathy (Decety, 
Jackson, 2006). Children’s play has been re-
cognized as an important basis for the acqui-
sition of symbolic reasoning, which enables 
a child, for example, to take a perceived ob-
ject (e.g., a pencil) as a symbol for something 
else (e.g., a person or a tree). Within the PSI 
framework, this symbolization corresponds to 
a transition from a dominance of object reco-
gnition (Figure 1) to the level of internal re-
presentations which eventually leads to the
development of extension memory and the in-
tegrative self: When children learn to imagine 
mental states they are able to form mental re-
presentations of another person’s mental state 
(e.g., thoughts, intentions, mood) even if those 
representations are different from observable 
objects in the external world or from their own 
subjective state. A failure at this developmen-
tal task can result in an impairment of social 
skills that heavily draw upon the ability to di-
stinguish one’s own or others’ emotional states 
from the objective external world (e.g., when
a borderline patient misattributes his own an-
ger to an “aggressive gesture” of another per-
son – who might actually behave in a very 
friendly manner).
According to the second modulation as-
sumption of PSI theory, a high-level form 
of empathy with another person’s emotion-
al state (i.e., “accommodative empathy”) de-
velops through the emotional dialectics driv-
ing the continuous exchange between the 
integrated self and focusing on single “ob-
jects” that are unexpected, unwanted or oth-
erwise not “fi tting” within the integrated self 
(i.e., when a shift occurs between negative af-
fect and its downregulation). During child-
hood this process requires consistent support 
from caretakers in helping the child tolerate 
and regulate negative emotional states (rath-
er than defensively avoiding them). Accom-
modative empathy differs from a simpler form 
(i.e., “assimilative empathy”) in which holistic 
representations of others‘ states can be easi-
ly understood (and felt empathically) provided 
they are already integrated within the self sys-
tem (i.e., when they feel “familiar”). This sim-
ple form of empathy does not require emotion-
al dialectics because it is confi ned to others’ 
emotional states as long as they are similar to 
one’s own state and can be easily assimilated. 
From the PSI perspective, assimilative empa-
thy does not require a shift from object recog-
nition (left hemisphere) to extension memory 
(right hemisphere). Instead, ipsilateral cooper-
ation of intuitive behavior control and the in-
tegrated self are suffi cient.
The more diffi cult form of (accommoda-
tive) empathy entails the ability to focus on 
painful discrepancies between one’s own state 
and somebody else’s current state. This ability 
to feel and understand another person‘s state 
even if it differs substantially from one’s own 
current states or those experienced in the past 
can be developed through frequent shifts from 
holistic processing to object-focused process-
ing and vice versa (Figure 1). This shift sup-
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ports the development of “accommodative 
empathy”, that is the ability to understand and 
feel another person’s actual state, even if it 
substantially departs from one’s own or any 
personally familiar state. Accommodative em-
pathy includes the ability to empathically feel 
another person‘s state without confounding it 
with one’s own emotional state. 
Ideally, the two forms of empathy cooper-
ate. Assimilative empathy is activated through 
“emotional contagion” when another person’s 
state is or becomes similar to one’s own cur-
rent state whereas accommodative empathy 
emerges when emotional similarity or con-
tagion do not work because the discrepancy 
among one’s own and another person’s states 
cannot be overcome by similarity detection or 
emotional contagion. Self-growth is imped-
ed by developmental conditions that inter-
fere with the dialectical shift between those 
two forms of empathy, that is between holistic 
representations of familiar states (assimilative 
empathy) and focused recognition of self-dis-
crepant states of others (accommodative em-
pathy). On the other hand, healthy self-growth 
is promoted through autonomy support, that is 
when children or adults have the opportunity 
to interact with people who respond prompt-
ly and effi ciently to the their needs (Ryan et 
al., 2006). Repeated validation of one’s own 
feelings seems to be a prerequisite for learn-
ing to empathize both with familiar and with 
unfamiliar or even self-alien feelings of others 
without losing contact with one’s own internal 
states: When caretakers mirror a child’s emo-
tional state (“you look so sad”) and simultane-
ously express their own emotions even if they 
differ from the child’s state, children learn to 
represent others’ emotional states separately 
from their own state even if the latter differ 
from the former. This ability should be a pre-
requisite for developing accommodative em-
pathy.
Perhaps the most important step in healthy 
development of an integrated and autonomous 
self concerns the acquisition of affect-regula-
tory skills. Vygotsky (1978) described the de-
velopment of self-regulation in terms of an in-
ternalization of external regulation received 
from a caretaker. For example, the encour-
agement experienced from his father in diffi -
cult situations later enables a boy to generate 
encouragement himself in diffi cult situations 
(i.e., self-motivation). Within the PSI frame-
work, this process is specifi ed in more detail 
in the systems conditioning model: Self-regu-
lation of affect (e.g., self-motivation or self-
relaxation) requires a strengthening of the 
connectivity between the self (e.g., some net-
work in the right prefrontal cortex) and an af-
fect generating system (e.g., in the reward or 
punishment part of the limbic system, respec-
tively). New connections are strengthened in 
the brain when the networks to be connected 
are activated almost simultaneously. Classical 
conditioning is the most familiar example for 
this process (Schmajuk, DiCarlo, 1992). 
What does “quasi-simultaneous activation
of the processes to be connected” mean for 
strengthening the connection between the self 
and affect generating systems? If quasi-simul-
taneous activation is crucial for strengthening 
the connectivity between those two systems, 
the affect generation system needs to be ac-
tivated (e.g., when a caretaker encourages or 
soothes a child) in temporal contiguity with an 
activation of the self system. However, how 
can a caretaker tell when the child’s self would 
be activated? The answer is simple: A system 
is activated when it is needed. The self is need-
ed for expression of one’s feelings (the right 
prefrontal cortex is indeed activated when ba-
bies express their distress at their mother leav-
ing the room: Fox, Davidson, 1987). Later in 
life, the self is needed to feel understood (as a 
person) and to understand another person and 
empathize with him or her (Decety, Jackson, 
2006). This is another way of saying that the 
self is activated through mutual understand-
ing, that is within positive personal relation-
ships. We can conclude, then, that external 
affect regulation is internalized when it is pro-
vided by a caretaker in conjunction with the 
child’s self being active, that is when the child 
feels understood and accepted within a per-
sonal relationship. The mere frequency of en-
couragement, of positive mood, or of soothing 
and relaxation does not suffi ce: It may change 
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affective sensitivity, but it would not change 
affect regulation because the latter requires a 
strengthening between the self and affective-
ly sensitive systems which in turn requires ex-
ternal regulation of affect to occur in positive 
personal relationships (i.e., when the child’s 
self is activated).
The explanatory power of PSI theory for 
understanding healthy development of self-re-
lated competencies can even be expanded be-
yond the level described until now: When the 
two macro-functions (i.e., action control and 
self-growth) are decomposed into their func-
tional components explanatory power increas-
es substantially. In the context of an extended 
research program focusing on the develop-
mental precursors of action control and self-
growth, our team at the Research Center for 
Aptitude Development at Osnabrück (Low-
er Saxony Institute for Early Childhood Edu-
cation and Development: http://nifbe.de/pag-
es/das-institut/forschung/begabung.php) has 
developed new methods for the assessment 
of developmental precursors of action con-
trol and self-development. Empirical fi ndings 
are consistent with the central hypothesis that 
the quality of relationships between child and 
adult promote the development of self-compe-
tencies (e.g., intention memory, frustration tol-
erance, empathy, integration of negative expe-
rience, intrinsic motivation etc.) and that those 
competencies moderate the degree to which
a child‘s abilities can be transformed into per-
formance, which in turn promotes further de-
velopment of latent abilities (Kuhl, Künne, 
Aufhammer, 2011; Völker, Schwer, 2011).
MALADAPTIVE PATHWAYS
OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT
A pivotal developmental step concerns the co-
ordination of explicit and implicit mental re-
presentations which probably involves the co-
ordination between the two hemispheres. Im-
plicit-explicit coordination (and its cross-he-
mispheric basis) should be involved when pa-
rents verbalize their children’s mental states 
(e.g., “Oh, you look so happy right now”). The 
explicit (denotative) part of this message is 
largely processed in the left hemisphere. Pre-
sumably, when the verbalization approximates 
the child’s implicit subjective state (typical-
ly represented in the right hemisphere) rather 
well, explicit and implicit systems develop
a smooth cooperative interaction in which the 
explicit system mirrors the implicit (experien-
tial) one and the implicit system may learn to 
generate emotional support for whatever go-
als or intentions the explicit system comes up 
with (as long as those goals are or can be made 
self-compatible). However, when the careta-
ker’s verbalizations do not match the child’s 
implicit experience, coordination of explicit 
and implicit systems can be disrupted. 
Examples of this case are parents’ impos-
ing their goals, aspirations or even their prob-
lems and confl icts on the child irrespective of 
his or her current mental state. In our (post-) 
modern world disruptions between left hem-
ispheric verbal input and right hemispheric 
personal experience are strongly enforced by 
the information overload coming from the me-
dia, internet, and child-computer interactions. 
These effects can disrupt the mirroring of chil-
dren’s internal states even when parents are 
doing well in explicitly mirroring their chil-
dren‘s implicit states (a computer game or 
TV does not reliably mirror the child’s cur-
rent emotional state in a self-compatible way). 
Even more serious dissociations between hem-
ispheres can be caused by severe cases of trau-
matization (e.g., when an adult abusing a child 
describes his behavior as a sign of his love 
and affection for the child). Most of those pa-
rental failures to align their explicit feedback 
with the child’s internal state can be related 
to what Rogers (1961) called “conditions of 
worth”: To the extent that children’s (implicit) 
experiential states are not refl ected in explicit 
verbalizations they hear from their caretakers 
children implicitly learn that their experiential 
states are not respected as they are, but need to 
be changed or distorted in explicit communi-
cation in order to be accepted by the adult.
In the following paragraphs, I will apply
this functional analysis provided by PSI
theory to a deeper explanation of psycholog-
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ical symptoms caused by disruptions among 
explicit and implicit systems. Presumably, pa-
tients who have been exposed to developmen-
tal conditions of invalid parental feedback de-
velop symptoms such as procrastination and 
other impairments of action control (e.g., 
messy behavior), eating disorders, severe dis-
ruptions of social interaction, psychosomat-
ic complaints associated with impaired stress 
regulation or even auto-aggressive behavior 
(Blasczyk-Schiep, 2004; Fonagy et al., 2002; 
Linehan, 1993; Sapolsky, 1992). Analyzing 
those symptoms within the functional archi-
tecture of personality provided by PSI theory 
(Ritz-Schulte, Schmidt, Kuhl, 2008), we can 
explain them on the basis of impairments of 
action control or self-development and the dis-
ruption of the two forms of affect regulation 
which modulate the interaction among the sys-
tems relevant for action control or self-devel-
opment, respectively (see diagonal arrows in 
Figure 1). 
SYMPTOMS RELATED TO REDUCED 
POSITIVE AFFECT AND IMPAIRED 
ACTION CONTROL
Let us begin with symptoms presumably asso-
ciated with impaired action control. What do 
procrastination, messy behavior, and eating di-
sorders have in common? From an action con-
trol point of view, these symptoms are asso-
ciated with an impairment of the motivational 
basis for instrumental behavior, that is a gene-
ral problem of action control which need not 
be confi ned to the specifi c symptoms at hand. 
Procrastinators, messies and many patients 
with eating disorders may have no problem 
engaging in any immediately gratifying beha-
vior. Their problems arise when they want to 
engage in some unattractive instrumental be-
havior (not necessarily related to their speci-
fi c symptoms) in order to reach a goal (e.g., 
studying a boring lecture to be well prepared 
for an exam). Kurt Lewin (1936) has already 
mentioned that it is diffi cult to explain, from 
an action theoretical point of view, why a per-
son should engage in any instrumental beha-
vior that does not have a positive valence in 
and of its own. Where does the energy come 
from that would motivate the person to engage 
in unattractive behavior? 
One possible pathway is designed for at-
tempts to avoid an aversive state. This path-
way starts with the negative affect associated 
with the to-be-avoided aversive state. Posi-
tive affect may be involved here as a second-
ary source of behavioral facilitation: a certain 
type of positive affect (e.g., relief), derives 
from avoiding an aversive state. In behavioral 
learning theory, this condition is called nega-
tive reinforcement. Presumably, external con-
trol is mediated by a similar form of avoidance 
motivation. The avoidance-based pathway 
from external control to behavior control is il-
lustrated in Figure 1 as a possible continuation 
of the external control pathway indicated by 
labels in italics which starts with some sort of 
external control (e.g., mother telling the child 
to fi nish homework in a strict tone): From the 
PSI point of view, positive affect caused by 
the relief from negative affect, that is avoid-
ance motivation (e.g., when the child, after 
starting with his homework, feels some relief 
from his anxiety to get punished) may intensi-
fy object-oriented automatic (intuitive) behav-
ior because object recognition is enhanced by 
negative affect. Recall that object recognition 
amounts to focusing on single details abstracted 
from their context (e.g., focusing on a requested 
outcome without taking into account the moti-
vational context comprising many positive and 
negative valences associated with the activity). 
As a result behavior becomes rigidly and nar-
rowly focused on the requested outcome rather 
than the motivational context of the activity in 
question (Elliot, McGregor, 2001).
Self-control is functionally similar to ex-
ternal control. In contrast to automatic and
intuitive behavior control, self-control in-
volves an explicit intention which is normal-
ly formed when enactment is emotionally dif-
fi cult (i.e., with an unattractive instrumental 
activity). According to PSI theory, self-con-
trol can be conceptualized as an internalized 
form of external control: In either case an in-
tention is generated (either external or by an 
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internal “controller”) and enactment of that 
intention does not require coordination with 
(right hemispheric) high level self-regula-
tory processing such as self-motivation. As 
mentioned earlier, the latter mode of volition 
which is called “self-regulation” is not as nar-
rowly focused on one behavioral intention as 
it is the case for self-control. Specifi cally, self-
regulation involves the wide experiential net-
work provided by extension memory and the 
integrated self (Figure 1). This explains the 
enormous fl exibility associated with self-regu-
lation and personal autonomy or self-determi-
nation (Ryan et al., 2006): When the intended 
action fails to reach the goal alternative new 
options for action can be retrieved from exten-
sion memory. Also, the extended connectivi-
ty between extension memory and emotions 
opens many possibilities for fi nding motiva-
tional support for an intended action (i.e., self-
-motivation). For example, when a boring 
math lesson from a textbook has to be mem-
orized, the extended experiential network of 
the integrated self may remind of some pos-
itive sides of that lesson (e.g., things one can 
do with this knowledge) or of the positive im-
plications of obtaining a good grade etc). 
 In contrast, self-control has limited access 
to positive incentives for action and it is nar-
rowly focused on one specifi c action: In Fig-
ure 1 the fi nal part of the self-control pathway 
is denoted by the horizontal arrow between 
object recognition (which can be intensifi ed 
by negative affect if there is one) and intuitive
behavior control. Both external control and 
self control can be described in PSI theory 
with or without avoidance motivation. With-
out avoidance motivation object recognition
simply focuses on an outcome to be achieved 
or on an error to be corrected and automati-
cally elicits appropriate behavioral routines 
to reach the desired outcome or to correct the
error, respectively: In Figure 1 the external/
self-control route from intention memory (in-
dicated in italics) can reach the intuitive be-
havior control system either through the avoid-
ance motivation pathway or through the direct 
pathway from object recognition into beha-
vior control. 
The latter “affect-free” route is based on the 
fact that PSI theory integrates neurobiologi-
cal evidence suggesting a route into behavio-
ral facilitation which does not necessarily de-
pend on participation of reward or punishment 
systems (i.e., on approach or avoidance ori-
ented incentives). This nigrostriatal dopamin-
ergic system can support automatic (habitu-
al) behavior without the mediation of reward 
or punishment related affect (Depue, Spoont, 
1986; Faure et al., 2005). For example, habit-
ual tooth-brushing in the morning may be
performed automatically, that is even when 
one does not enjoy it and even in the absence 
of any avoidance motivation (e.g., thinking of 
the negative consequences of a failure to do 
it). Empirical evidence for this automatic and 
potentially incentive-free form of behavioral 
facilitation has been collected by Gollwitzer 
(1999) and his associates. 
Either self-control route into behavioral 
facilitation (i.e., the automatic and the avoid-
ance-oriented one) can be a basis for highly 
committed work motivation, even up to the 
risk of workaholism and other forms of com-
pulsive behavior (Wojdyło, 2010). People who 
have problems initiating instrumental behavior 
can sometimes perform instrumental activities 
through one of the two self-control forms of 
behavioral facilitation (i.e., when their behav-
ior is energized through negative incentives, 
time pressure, external threats or through in-
centive-free automatized habitual behavior). 
Their problems arise in situations in which 
they cannot rely on negative incentives (e.g., 
external pressure or threat) or automatized be-
havior. In such cases, failure to enact instru-
mental behavior occurs when people who typ-
ically rely on external incentive or self-control 
are confronted with situations in which behav-
ioral facilitation largely depends on positive 
incentives (e.g., at home, during leisure time, 
in friendly contexts etc.) or when the individ-
ual’s sensitivity to punishment or negative
affect is rather low, dispositionally or tempo-
rarily. 
It should be noted that instrumental ac-
tivities are typically associated with low pos-
itive affect rather than with high negative
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affect (i.e., they are not attractive, but they 
need not be threatening). In this case, upregu-
lation of positive affect (i.e., self-motivation) 
is required as the natural form of behavioral 
facilitation. Self-motivation is not provided by 
self-control (which is associated with negative 
affect or affect-free automatic behavior). In-
stead, another form of volition is required, that 
is self-regulation in the sense described above: 
When intentions are to be enacted without au-
tomatic behavior control and without capital-
izing on negative affect and avoidance moti-
vation, the transition from intention memory 
to intuitive behavior control needs to be me-
diated by generating positive affect as a pri-
mary source of behavioral facilitation. Early 
behaviorists speculated that some sort of au-
tomatic anticipation of positive affect asso-
ciated with imagined goal attainment would 
provide the necessary behavioral facilitation
(cf. Atkinson, 1964). Do procrastinators, mes-
sies and under- or overeaters have problems 
imagining the positive sides of goal attainment 
(e.g., memorizing the boring lesson, cleaning
up one’s desk or keeping one’s dietary inten-
tions, respectively)? Even if this were the case, 
it would not suffi ce to explain their problems: 
Empirical studies revealed that, compared to 
negative imagery, positive goal imagery alone 
does not increase facilitation of instrumental 
behavior, that is behavior that requires the ac-
tor to complete some unpleasant or diffi cult 
steps (Oettingen, Pak, Schnetter, 2001). Oet-
tingen’s research demonstrates that positive 
anticipatory imagery needs to be coordinat-
ed (or “contrasted”) with the diffi cult instru-
mental steps to be taken, in order to improve 
effi cient action control (i.e., enactment of dif-
fi cult intentions without relying on automatic 
behavior or avoidance motivation).
According to PSI theory, a diffi cult inten-
tion is formed when people can tolerate the in-
hibition of positive affect (i.e., frustration or 
delay of reward) for a while (see Figure 1: A(+) 
and intention memory). An emotionally diffi -
cult intention is enacted when the motivational 
energy for (unattractive) instrumental behav-
ior can be generated. According to PSI theory, 
this positive energy is largely generated with-
in the self system through a process of self-
motivation (Figure 1) whose developmental 
conditions have been described in the systems 
conditioning model mentioned above (this as-
sumption has been confi rmed in a recent study 
in which self-generated behavioral facilitation 
was associated with a brain network which is 
close to the one supporting implicit self-repre-
sentations: Radke et al., 2008). From this point 
of view, the most obvious developmental con-
dition causing problems with instrumental be-
havior should be a lack of responsive (self-
contingent) encouragement during childhood: 
As mentioned earlier in this article, self-moti-
vation cannot develop unless parents provide 
suffi cient encouragement and their encourage-
ment connects with the child’s self (e.g., when 
encouragement is given when the child needs 
it and when the child feels secure and accept-
ed within a loving relationship). Fortunately, 
self-motivation training can be an effective 
remedy when applied later in life at school, 
during training, coaching or therapy (Kuhl, 
Kazén, Koole, 2006; Renger, 2009; Storch, 
Kuhl, 2011).
In many cases, the causes of impaired in-
strumental initiative are even deeper than the 
self-motivation problem. Even intact self-mo-
tivational abilities do not suffi ce when explic-
it and implicit systems (e.g., explicit intention-
ality and the implicit self) do not cooperate 
smoothly. Presumably, the process of self-
motivation requires some cross-hemispher-
ic coordination to be put into effect: The im-
plicit self with its affect generating capacity 
seems to be supported by the right prefron-
tal cortex (Kircher et al., 2002; Levesque et 
al., 2003; Molnar-Szakacs, Uddin, Iacoboni, 
2005) whereas explicit (verbalized) intentions 
should typically depend on left hemispheric 
networks (Kimura, in press; Toga, Thompson, 
2003). Hence, enactment of explicit intentions 
requires a coordination between a left hemi-
spheric network maintaining the intention in 
an active (explicitly verbal) state and a right 
hemispheric network generating the necessary 
positive energy to overcome the unattractive 
valence of the instrumental steps to be taken. 
We can now understand why the discrepancy 
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between explicit communication and implicit 
experience during childhood mentioned at the 
beginning of this section can interfere with ac-
tion control, that is the enactment of explic-
itly intended unattractive instrumental behav-
ior. Symptoms that Freud explained in terms 
of a regression to the oral stage can be ex-
plained today in terms of an impaired interac-
tion among (left hemispheric) explicit inten-
tions (cf. Freud’s ego) and (right hemispheric) 
experiential networks (i.e., the implicit self, 
not elaborated in Freud’s theorizing) provid-
ing the motivational basis necessary to over-
come the negative valence associated with in-
strumental steps toward the goal. 
In this case, any intervention that sup-
ports the interaction between explicit inten-
tionality and the implicit experiential sys-
tem (i.e., the self) should alleviate problems 
to enact unpleasant instrumental behavior. 
The work by Oettingen and her associates 
(2001) mentioned earlier confi rms this claim: 
Having participants alternate between posi-
tive fantasies about goal attainment (which 
should activate the right, experiential, hem-
isphere) and the diffi cult steps to be enacted 
(presumably activating the left hemisphere) 
signifi cantly increases their volitional effi -
ciency (i.e., the proportion of intentions en-
acted). Presumably, this alternation treatment 
improves the cooperation between the hemi-
spheres, which is especially important when 
participants are locked into one of the hemi-
spheres (e.g., when somebody is over-analytic 
or over-impressionistic, roughly comparable 
to the two types of insecure attachment, that 
is the avoidant and the ambivalent type: Blatt, 
Levy, 2003). To the extent that, in western
(or westernized) countries, hemispheric over-
activation more frequently affects the left than 
the right hemisphere, supporting shifts toward 
right-hemispheric processing may be especial-
ly useful. This hypothesis was confi rmed in a 
recent study: Activating the right hemisphere 
restores self-access (Baumann, Kuhl, Kazén, 
2005). In a similar vein, the overestimation of 
own body size observed in patients with eat-
ing disorders seems to be mediated by the left 
hemisphere (Smeets, Kosslyn, 2001) and can 
be reduced by activating the right hemisphere 
(Kazén et al., 2011).
The distinction between approach and 
avoidance routes into high-level forms of be-
havioral facilitation (e.g., self-regulation vs. 
self-control, respectively) helps understand
a paradoxical observation many patients re-
port: As long as there is some external pres-
sure or anticipation of negative consequenc-
es they can enact their intentions because they 
can utilize the self-control form of behavio-
ral facilitation; but as soon as external pres-
sure subsides, they have problems to initiate 
even simple instrumental activities (e.g., help-
ing with domestic chores; tidying up one’s 
desk etc.). In situations providing neither
external pressure nor other sources of avoid-
ance motivation impairments of action control 
are caused by those patients‘ problem to enter 
the self-regulation mode which would gener-
ate the positive affect needed to overcome the
insuffi cient positive valence of instrumental 
activities.
The hemispheric coordination hypothe-
sis may even be applied to explain some pa-
tients’ problems in social interaction which 
seem to result from childhood experience of 
invalid communication involving a mismatch 
between explicit and implicit channels: Some 
of these patients have problems even in pos-
itive relationships because they keep worry-
ing about the other person’s emotional state 
or about other aspects of the relationship (e.g., 
whether it might break down when the oth-
er person discovers some negative side of the 
actor). It should be noted that those problems 
can occur without any hemispheric coordi-
nation problems because the mere content of 
such worries may interfere with smooth and 
gratifying social interactions. However, the 
functional view proposed by PSI theory pro-
vides an additional (or alternative) possibility: 
Worries can be the consequence of impaired 
hemispheric coordination rather than its cause. 
Presumably, individuals who have often been 
exposed to incongruence between implicit 
and explicit messages early in their lives have
acquired a dissociation between explicit and 
implicit systems. This can result in automatic
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dissociation even in positive contexts: For ex-
ample when their implicit experiential system 
is activated by a mutually satisfying interac-
tional experience (e.g., in a loving relation-
ship), their explicit system often fails to be-
come coordinated with this experience simply 
because of the learned dissociation between 
the two systems. In this case worrying thoughts 
that accompany and possibly interrupt the pos-
itive experience are the consequence of an ac-
quired dissociation of the two hemispheres 
rather than its cause.
Having diffi culties in completing one’s in-
tentions (i.e., when people are confronted with 
many demands) may reduce well-being (Bau-
mann, Kaschel, Kuhl, 2005). People who ha-
bitually inhibit positive affect (e.g., charac-
terized by a reserved, analytical, or schizoid 
personality style) report reduced well-being 
unless they can counterregulate reduced pos-
itive affect (Baumann, Kaschel, Kuhl, 2007). 
However, impairments of self-motivation and 
action control do not cause psychosomatic 
symptoms (Baumann, Kaschel, Kuhl, 2005). 
In the next section, I will discuss the dynam-
ics underlying psychosomatic symptoms and 
some other disorders related to downregula-
tion of negative rather than upregulation of 
positive affect.
SYMPTOMS RELATED TO 
INCREASED NEGATIVE AFFECT
AND IMPAIRED SELF-GROWTH
Besides symptoms related to impaired action 
control there is another class of symptoms. 
These symptoms are typically characterized 
by impaired performance of complex tasks or
tasks involving episodic or spatial memory. 
Additional symptoms of this category are ri-
gidity when faced with changes in the envi-
ronment and stress-dependent psychosomatic 
complaints which range from headache, back 
pain, stomach ulcers to insomnia, sexual mal-
function and even impaired immune function 
(Sapolsky, 1992). Taking the PSI perspective, 
we can detect a common functional element 
across those phenotypically diverse symp-
toms: Each of them can be related to an impa-
irment of some integrative function. Complex 
tasks such as dealing with an eco-system, ma-
naging a company or a city (Brehmer, Dörner, 
1993) or making a complex decision require 
the integration of a variety of input informa-
tion. Likewise, episodic and spatial memory 
systems are based on an integration of many 
pieces of information making up an autobio-
graphical episode or a cognitive map of the 
environment, respectively. 
Does fl exible adjustment to new situations 
(i.e., overcoming rigid adherence to ongoing 
behavior) and adaptive modulation of the psy-
chosomatic interface (e.g., unconscious regu-
lation of bodily functions) also require some 
form of integration? I propose that this is the 
case. However, fl exibility and psychosomatic 
regulation require a different form of integra-
tion compared to the complexity-based form. 
Specifi cally, fl exibility and psychosomatic 
regulation are based on some “vertical” rather 
than horizontal integration: When a new situ-
ation arises (e.g., when in the Wisconsin card 
sorting test, the experimenter surreptitious-
ly changes the category defi ning “correct” re-
sponses), a dominant (habitual) response cat-
egory has to be inhibited and replaced by
a new response category. Quickly installing this 
new guide for action requires some top-down
(executive) control (Barceló, Knight 2002). 
In a similar vein, regulating emotions (e.g., 
by self-motivation or self-relaxation) and oth-
er somatic processes (including immune func-
tions) also requires an intact top-down fl ow of 
control which is impeded by excessive stress 
even in animals (Schmajuk, DiCarlo, 1992). 
In light of the substantial differences be-
tween horizontal and vertical forms of integra-
tive competence, one may wonder whether it 
is justifi ed to postulate a common mechanism 
affecting either form of integration. Within the 
PSI framework, the integrative self presuma-
bly has either potential: the (horizontal) inte-
gration of information across an extended se-
mantic network (Baumann, Kuhl, 2002) and 
the vertical impact on elementary process-
es such as object recognition (Kuhl, 1981) or 
stress reduction (Quirin et al. 2009). Keeping 
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object recognition from unwanted “rumina-
tion” about an isolated discrepant detail like 
a failure or reducing the production of cortisol
are examples of effi cient top down regulation 
emanating from the implicit self (which does 
not “want” the rumination) and keeping ob-
ject recognition from ruminating about task-
irrelevant objects: This case can be depicted 
in Figure 1 by inverting the direction of the ar-
row connecting object recognition and exten-
sion memory. Affect regulation is depicted in 
Figure 1 by arrows from the implicit self (ex-
tension memory) to positive or (low) negative 
affect, respectively (cf. the arrows for self-mo-
tivation and self-relaxation in Figure 1). 
It should be noted that, in PSI theory, per-
sonality functioning is not confi ned to the 
three levels of personality illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, that is the level of intentional control 
and self-regulation (intention and extension 
memories), the level of elementary perceptu-
al and behavioral processing (object recog-
nition and intuitive behavior control) and the 
level of positive and negative affect. PSI the-
ory describes four additional levels of person-
ality (Table 1): a level of temperament (global 
motor activation and sensory arousal), a pre-
conceptual level of cognitive-emotional inte-
gration (imagery, motives), the level of con-
ceptual thinking (which closely cooperates 
with intention memory: Figure 1) and a stress-
sensitive intermediate level that relays the im-
pact of the three high level systems (i.e., pre-
conceptual motives, conceptual thinking, and 
both intentionality and self-regulation) to-
ward low level systems thereby regulating ob-
ject perception (e.g., terminating rumination 
or sensitizing for self-congruent information), 
temperament (e.g., reducing overarousal or in-
creasing motor activation) and modifying af-
fect intensity as in self-motivation and to self-
-relaxation (see Kuhl, Koole, 2008, for a more 
detailed account of the seven levels of person-
ality functioning in PSI theory). 
Neurobiological evidence confi rms the 
role assigned to the stress-sensitive interme-
diate level of personality functioning pos-
tulated in PSI theory: The hippocampus is
a system which (horizontally, that is within 
levels of personality functioning) integrates
elements making up autobiographical episo-
des (Squire, 1992) or spatial representations
of the environment (Meaney et al., 1988). In 
addition, the hippocampus (vertically, i.e., 
across levels of personality functioning) relays 
top-down effects from neocortical networks 
toward subcortical networks involved in af-
fect regulation, perception and (automatic)
Table 1. PSI theory differentiates 7 levels of personality functioning and subdivides each into a primarily 
behavior-focused and a primarily experience-focused system (with the possibility of secondary crossovers, 
e.g. when positive affect is contemplated rather than serving its primary function of behavioral facilitation 
or when negative affect energizes fl ight or fi ght behavior). Note: Levels included in Figure 1 are in italics.
Level Behavior Focus Experience Focus
7. Volition Intention Memory: Ego Extension Memory: Self
6. Cognition: Concepts Local Goals, Plans Global Goals, Meaning
5. Preconceptual
 (associative networks)
Effectance Motives
(achievement, power)
Experiential Motives(affi liation,
freedom)
4. Stress-dependent Pro- vs.
 Regression
Top-Down (Progression:
moderate stress)
Bottom-up (Regression: excessive
stress)
3. Incentives (affect-object links) Positive Affect Negative Affect
2. Temperament
 (global, opportunistic)
Motor Activation Sensory Arousal
1. Elementary Control Intuitive Behavior Control Object Recognition
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behavior control (Pruessner et al., 2005; 
Schmajuk, DiCarlo, 1992). The hippocam-
pus has a high density of glucocorticoid recep-
tors which are activated when the stress hor-
mone cortisol exceeds a critical concentration. 
In this case hippocampal functions are inhibit-
ed (Sapolsky, 1992). 
This mechanism provides a simple explana-
tion of the common psychological basis of the 
symptoms related to impaired horizontal and 
vertical integration (i.e., deterioration in per-
formance of complex tasks, rigidity, and psy-
chosomatic symptoms): When stress intensi-
ty exceeds a critical level and cannot be down-
regulated, the risk to develop those symptoms 
increases because of the impairment of hori-
zontal and vertical integration which is pre-
sumably mediated by the hippocampus and all 
integrative functions drawing upon it (includ-
ing the integrative self). From the perspective 
of PSI theory it is important to note that those 
integration-impeding effects are closely relat-
ed to excessive negative affect rather than a re-
duction of positive affect (recall that we have 
identifi ed the latter as a determinant of impair-
ments of action control). An empirical test of 
the hypothesis that the stress hormone cortisol 
should be associated with impaired self-access 
confi rmed this hypothesis by showing that an 
increase in cortisol after a stress induction pre-
dicted self-infi ltration, that is the number of 
false self-ascriptions of tasks that were chosen 
by another person (Quirin et al., 2009; recall 
that self-infi ltration can be regarded as a con-
sequence of impaired self-access). 
The difference between symptoms relat-
ed to excessive negative affect and those rela-
ted to insuffi cient positive affect suggests mak-
ing a careful distinction between two different 
types of stress, that is one resulting from ex-
cessive negative affect (i.e., threat) and anoth-
er one resulting from (emotionally) diffi cult 
intentions (i.e., demands) which dampen pos-
itive affect needed for instrumental activities
(cf. Higgins, 1987, for a similar distinction). 
The former type of anxiety-prone stress asso-
ciated with increased negative affect has been 
related to hippocampal malfunction whereas 
the latter type of depression-prone stress is as-
sociated with dampened positive affect result-
ing from an overload of uncompleted inten-
tion and impairments of action control. When 
the two types of stress are assessed separate-
ly, their predicted consequences can be clearly 
distinguished: People reporting high demands 
in their everyday life (e.g., many uncompleted 
intentions) show signifi cantly reduced well-
being, but no increased risk of developing psy-
chosomatic symptoms (Baumann, Kaschel, 
Kuhl, 2005). On the other hand, the same
study demonstrated that an increased level of 
everyday threat-related stress (involving high 
negative rather than low positive affect) did 
increase psychosomatic risk across a varie-
ty of symptoms (assessed with the Symptom 
Checklist by Derogatis et al., 1974). Finally, 
the study revealed a hypothetical index of the 
degree of dissociation between explicit and im-
plicit self-representations (implicit measures 
vs. explicit self-ratings of one‘s achievement 
motive) as a mediator between demanding or 
threat-related stress and reduced well-being or 
psychosomatic symptoms, respectively (Bau-
mann, Kaschel, Kuhl, 2005).
Dissociation between explicit goals (self-
-reported motives or needs) and implicit mo-
tives or needs is important source of reduced 
well-being or increased psychosomatic risk 
(Baumann, Kaschel, Kuhl, 2005; Brunstein, 
Schultheiss, Grässmann, 1998). When self-re-
ported needs or motives (assessed with ques-
tionnaires) underestimate the actual strengths 
of needs and motives (assessed through pro-
jective or operant methods such as the Themat-
ic Apperception Test), people do not form ex-
plicit goals that satisfy their needs. Conversely, 
when people overestimate their needs and mo-
tives, they are likely to form explicit goals that 
are not emotionally supported by their needs. 
In an ongoing project we replicated our ear-
lier fi ndings (Baumann, Kaschel, Kuhl, 2005) 
demonstrating discrepancies between explicit 
and implicit motives in patients suffering from 
diverse psychosomatic symptoms. Interesting-
ly, different motives were relevant for differ-
ent nosological categories: Depression was as-
sociated with a discrepancy between explicit 
and implicit needs for affi liation (commun-
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ion), substance abuse (alcoholism) was asso-
ciated with discrepancies between explicit and 
implicit power motives, and a dissociation be-
tween explicit and implicit achievement needs 
was observed in patients suffering from an 
overload of daily duties, including burn-out 
symptoms (Kazén, Kuhl, 2011). 
It should be noted that, according to PSI 
theory, affect regulation is more crucial for 
symptom formation than affective sensitivi-
ty as assessed by anxiety scales or extraver-
sion and neuroticism (i.e., two of Big Five 
personality factors: McCrae, Costa, 1987). 
In fact, the emotional dialectics underlying 
healthy action control and self-development 
(see Figure 1) suggests that even strong sen-
sitivity to negative affect or low sensitivity to 
positive affect can have benefi cial effects on 
self-growth or action control, respectively, 
provided those affective states can be counter-
regulated through appropriate affect-regulato-
ry abilities (i.e., self-motivation to counteract 
low positive affect or self-relaxation to down-
regulate high negative affect). In other words, 
the theory predicts that even strong negative 
emotional sensitivity as indicated by high 
scores on traditional personality scales (e.g., 
introversion, neuroticism, anxiety etc.) can be 
a basis for effi cient action control and success-
ful self-growth over the life span (as a buff-
er against psychosomatic illness) provided the 
primary negative response to new situations 
can be counterregulated by effective affect-
-regulatory competencies resulting in a less 
negative secondary response. 
This hypothesis has been confi rmed in
a study examining 154 patients suffering from 
diverse psychosomatic symptoms (Baumann, 
Kaschel, Kuhl, 2007): For example, a highly 
avoidant personality style (i.e., apprehensive-
ness toward social evaluation) was associated 
with increased risk of developing symptoms 
only in patients whose ability to downregu-
late negative affect was insuffi cient. A high-
ly avoidant, compared to an emotionally more 
robust, style even turned into a source of pro-
tection against symptoms (as indicated by
a signifi cantly reduced risk to develop psycho-
somatic symptoms), provided it came along 
with effi cient affect regulation. This counter-
intuitive (but theoretically expected) fi nding 
can be explained on the basis of the emotion-
al dialectics presumably underlying self-de-
velopment: High sensitivity toward negative
affect increases awareness of experiences that 
are diffi cult to integrate (and which emotional-
ly stable people might ignore); when this sen-
sitivity is combined with effective downregu-
lation of negative affect, painful experiences 
can be integrated into a growing self system 
(Figure 1). 
A particularly severe condition is the 
case when the two types of stress or the two 
types of affect regulatory impairments coin-
cide: When low positive affect is closely in-
tertwined with high negative affect, PSI the-
ory predicts the severe situation that the two 
basic competencies of healthy personality 
functioning (i.e., action control and self-ac-
cess) break down simultaneously. This condi-
tion may have serious implications for healthy 
personality development and for therapy suc-
cess (Cordero-Prantl, 2005): As long as only 
one of the two basic functions (i.e., action con-
trol or self-access) is impaired, the intact func-
tion may compensate for defi cits in the other 
function, at least to some extent. This assump-
tion can be tested by examining the interac-
tion between low positive affect (e.g. listless-
ness or dejection) and high negative affect.
If the combination of those two conditions 
is especially conducive to developing symp-
toms, those conditions should form a signifi -
cant interaction in producing adverse effects 
in a patient sample, but not in a sample of psy-
chologically healthy individuals. In a recent 
pilot study, this expectation was confi rmed: 
Within a sample of psychosomatic patients 
there was an interaction between self-reported 
listlessness (i.e., low positive affect) and neg-
ative affect on a measure of generalized hope-
lessness which turned out to be an indicator of 
symptom severity and reduced effectiveness 
of therapy. In contrast, a similar analysis con-
ducted in a non-clinical sample of university 
students yielded only additive main effects of 
listlessness and negative affect on occasional 
feelings of hopelessness. 
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These fi ndings suggest that, in normal per-
sonality functioning, action control and self-
development can operate independently when 
necessary. In contrast, in clinical patients, 
symptoms may be aggravated and therapy ren-
dered more diffi cult, when impaired action 
control interferes with self-development (e.g., 
learning from mistakes) and vice versa or, to 
put it in more basic terms, when negative af-
fect dampens positive affect or vice versa. It is 
not diffi cult to imagine the developmental pre-
cursors of this confounding of the two affective 
dimensions that are normally driven by inde-
pendent neuropsychological systems (Bernt-
son, Cacioppo, 2008) and can also be separated 
from a developmental point of view (MacDon-
ald, 1992): When parents respond to situations 
involving negative affect (e.g., a child has hurt 
herself) with admonitions (i.e., activating in-
tentions like “you have got to pay more at-
tention in the future”), a dampening of posi-
tive affect is conditioned upon the experience 
of negative affect (recall that any activation of 
intention memory can dampen positive affect). 
The coupling between the positive and nega-
tive affective systems can also be caused by 
the opposite condition, that is when caretakers 
respond to a reduction of positive affect (e.g.,
a child has lost a toy) with an induction of neg-
ative affect (e.g., through getting nervous or re-
sorting to verbal or physical punishment).
Another serious source of impaired action 
control and psychosomatic regulation requires 
an even deeper level of analysis: Dysfunction-
al coupling of affective dispositions can also 
happen at an even more elementary emotion-
al level. The source of this condition can be 
located at the level of temperament (Table 1) 
which dominates emotional life during the fi rst 
months of infancy, even before reliable bonds 
between specifi c objects and positive or neg-
ative affects are made (that is before “object 
permanence” has developed and incentive mo-
tivation dominates behavior). Emotions gener-
ated at this elementary level of personality have 
been called “proto-emotions” (Arieti, 1967) to 
denote their inarticulate and seemingly “irra-
tional” status which may partly be attributable 
to the fact that they do not form reliable bonds 
with objects. Instead, they diffusely emanate 
from several (often unintelligible) sources in 
the internal and external environment (e.g., 
unconscious needs, implicit stressors etc.). 
The proto-emotion which is especially rele-
vant for understanding impairments of action 
control and psychosomatic disorders is called 
tense arousal. This proto-emotion is charac-
terized by increased sensory arousal (compa-
rable to negative affect) combined with inhib-
ited motor activation (comparable to inhibited 
positive affect) which amounts to another ex-
ample of affect confounding (i.e., the coupling 
of positive and negative affects). Presumably, 
this combined proto-emotional condition can 
occur when caretakers fail to satisfy the infants 
needs (e.g., when mother is depressed, stressed 
or emotionally rejects her child). 
What is it that makes proto-emotions such 
as tense arousal have an impact on positive 
and negative affect? According to PSI theory, 
tense arousal simultaneously dampens positive 
and intensifi es negative affect: Motor activa-
tion and sensory arousal are two forms of tem-
perament that can intensify positive and neg-
ative affect, respectively (Diener et al., 1985; 
Lang, 1995). As a result, similar symptoms 
can be expected as discussed for low positive 
and high negative affect (i.e., impairments of 
action control and self-access or self-growth).
In addition, tense arousal can cause hemispher-
ic dissociation, even without incongruence be-
tween explicit and implicit channels happen-
ing between the child and his or her caretakers 
during later (verbal) stages of development. 
For example, when, later during development, 
a child or adolescent tries to make sense out 
of his inability to motivate himself for instru-
mental activities (“Why is it so diffi cult for me 
to keep my things in order or to study a diffi -
cult lesson?”) or when he or she, during adult-
hood, is confronted with some consequence of 
his or her impaired self-access (“Do I have the 
right size, the right weight, the right preferenc-
es?”), the explicit system may fi ll the explana-
tory gap with more or less acceptable construc-
tions: “I am too fat”, “I am not interested in 
diffi cult topics at school” etc. (Note that self-
access is necessary for developing a realistic 
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body image because the self-system is close-
ly intertwined with somatic representations: 
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, 2000). Training 
and therapy is more diffi cult when hemispher-
ic dissociation and impairments of action con-
trol and psychosomatic regulation have their 
roots at the level of temperament: At this level, 
affect regulation is much more diffi cult (e.g., 
because the true source of an emotional re-
sponse cannot be discerned) and, as a result, 
mentalization is rendered very diffi cult even if 
basic mentalization skills have been acquired 
during childhood: It is hard to form a mental 
representation of one‘s emotional state unless 
one can relate it to any source or object that 
elicited that emotion.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion I may summarize the contri-
bution of PSI theory to our understanding of 
symptom formation: Impairments of the in-
teraction among psychological systems ne-
cessary for action control and self-growth 
(including self-access) can contribute to the 
development of symptoms, over and above ef-
fects of psychodynamic confl icts, unfavora-
ble learning conditions (e.g., rewarding dys-
functional cognitive schemas or behavior), or 
unconscious attempts to manipulate family 
members (cf. Freud’s “secondary gains from 
illness” or similar arguments proposed by ear-
ly behaviorists). An additional or alternative 
developmental determinant of those defi cits 
can be an impaired development of affect re-
gulation which in turn can result from careta-
kers’ failure to provide suffi cient self-sensitive 
encouragement or relaxation during childhood 
and/or from invalid feedback causing a disso-
ciation between the child’s explicit and impli-
cit processing systems. 
Poor self-regulation of affect can even de-
velop when the frequency of encouragement 
or relaxation received from caretakers has 
been high: Affect-regulatory experiences can-
not be integrated into the self system unless 
the self is active during interactional episodes 
in which those encouraging or relaxing inter-
ventions occur. The self is active when an in-
dividual expresses his or her emotions or other 
mental states and (especially in later stages of 
development) when an individual feels under-
stood and accepted as a person (i.e., as a whole 
including his past, present and future inclina-
tions and experiences). In other words, even 
frequent encouragement and relaxation pro-
vided by caretakers cannot promote the devel-
opment of self-motivation or self-relaxation, 
respectively, unless it occurs within a person-
al context in which the child feels understood 
and accepted as a person (otherwise the self is 
not activated and affect-regulatory experienc-
es cannot be integrated into it). 
Finally, even when developmental condi-
tions for affect regulation have been optimal, 
an impaired coordination between hemispheres 
can interfere with the utilization of affect-reg-
ulatory skills for action control or self-growth: 
For those two fundamental personality func-
tions some coordination between one explic-
it and one implicit mental system is required 
in addition to self-regulation of affect: the co-
ordination between intention memory and in-
tuitive behavior control is needed for action 
control and the coordination between object 
recognition and the implicit self is required 
for self-growth (integrating a single painful or 
self-alien experience into the extended self). 
The functional account of symptom forma-
tion provided by PSI theory can be applied for
a better understanding of the mechanisms un-
derlying various interventions in training and 
therapy (Kuhl, 2007; Kuhl, Kazén, Koole, 
2006) and it can be used to develop additional 
methods for alleviating impairments of action 
control and psychosomatic regulation (Storch, 
Kuhl, 2011).
NOTE
1 I would like to express special thanks to Brigitte Ruploh for helpful and inspiring discussions on the 
intricacies and paradoxes discernible across a variety of mental disorders.
28 Julius Kuhl
REFERENCES
Abramson L.Y., Seligman M.E.P., Teasdale J. (1978), Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Refor-
mulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49–79.
Arieti S. (1967), The Intrapsychic Self: Feeling, Cognition, and Creativity in Health and Mental Illness. New 
York: Basic Books.
Atkinson J.W. (1964), An Introduction to Motivation. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
Bandura A. (1989), Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory. American Psychologist, 44, 1175–1184.
Barceló F., Knight R.F. (2002), Both Random and Perseverative Errors Underlie WCST Defi cits in Prefrontal 
Patients. Neuropsychologia, 40, 349–356. 
Baumann N., Kaschel R., Kuhl J. (2005), Striving for Unwanted Goals: Stress-dependent Discrepancies be-
tween Explicit and Implicit Achievement Motives Reduce Subjective Well-being and Increase Psychoso-
matic Symptoms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 781–799.
Baumann N., Kaschel R., Kuhl J. (2007), Affect Sensitivity and Affect Regulation in Dealing with Positive 
and Negative Affect. Journal of Research in Personality, 41, 239–248.
Baumann N., Kuhl, J. (2002), Intuition, Affect, and Personality: Unconscious Coherence Judgments and Self-
regulation of Negative Affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1213–1223.
Baumann N., Kuhl J. (2003), Self-infi ltration: Confusing Assigned Tasks as Self-selected in Memory. Person-
ality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 487–497.
Baumann N., Kuhl J., Kazén M. (2005), Hemispheric Activation and Self-infi ltration: Testing a Neuropsycho-
logical Model of Internalization. Motivation and Emotion, 29, 135–163.
Bechara A., Damasio H., Damasio A.R. (2000), Emotion, Decision-making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex. 
Cerebral Cortex, 10, 295–307.
Berntson G.G., Cacioppo J.T. (2008), The Functional Neuroarchitecture of Evaluative Processes [in:]
A.J. Elliot (ed.), Handbook of Approach and Avoidance Motivation, 307–322. New York, NY: Psychol-
ogy Press.
Blasczyk-Schiep S. (2004), Selbststeuerung und Suizidrisiko. Self-regulation and Suicidal Risk. Bern, New 
York: Peter Lang.
Blatt S.J., Levy K.N. (2003), Attachment Theory, Psychoanalysis, Personality Development, and Psychopa-
thology. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 23, 102–150.
Blatt S.J., Auerbach J.S., Levy K.N. (1997). Mental Representations in Personality Development, Psycho-
pathology, and the Therapeutic Process. Review of General Psychology, 1, 351–374; doi: 10.1037/1089-
2680.1.4.351
Brehmer B., Dörner, D. (1993), Experiments with Computer-simulated Microworlds: Escaping Both the Nar-
row Straits of the Laboratory and the Deep Blue Sea of the Field Study. Computers in Human Behavior, 
9, 171–184.
Brunstein J.C., Schultheiss O.C., Grässmann R. (1998), Personal Goals and Emotional Well-being: The Mod-
erating Role of Motive Dispositions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 494–508.
Castonguay L.G. (2011), Psychotherapy, Psychopathology, Research and Practice: Pathways of Connections 
and Integration, Psychotherapy Research, 21, 125–140.
Cordero-Prantl S. (2005), Persönlichkeitsstile und Psychische Erkrankung (Achse I und II): Zur Rolle von 
Bedürfnisfrustration, Stress, Affekten und Selbststeuerungsdefi ziten [Personality Styles and Mental
Illness (Axis I and II): The Role of Need Frustration, Stress, Affective Sensitivity and Affect Regulation]. 
Unpublished Dissertation. Universität Osnabrück.
Decety J., Jackson P.L. (2006), A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 15, 54–58.
Depue R.A., Spoont M.R. (1986), Conceptualizing a Serotonin Trait: A Behavioral Dimension of Constraint. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 487, 47–61.
Derogatis L.R., Lipman R.S., Rickels K., Uhlenhuth E.H., Covi L. (1974), The Hopkins Symptom Checklist 
(HSCL): A self-report symptom inventory. Behavioral Science, 19, 1–15.
Diener E., Larsen R.J., Levine S., Emmons R.E. (1985), Intensity and Frequency: Dimensions Underlying 
Positive and Negative Affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 580–592.
29Adaptive and Maladaptive Pathways of Self-Development: Mental Health and Interactions…
Elliot A.J., McGregor H.A. (2001), A 2 x 2 Achievement Goal Framework. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 80, 501–519.
Faure A., Haberland U., Condé F., El Massioui N. (2005), Lesion to the Nigrostriatal Dopamine System 
Disrupts S-R Habit Formation. The Journal of Neuroscience, 25, 2771–2780; doi:10.1523/JNEUROS-
CI.3894-04.2005
First M.B., Tasman A. (2004), DSM-IV-TR Mental Disorders: Diagnosis, Etiology and Treatment. Chiches-
ter, GB: Wiley.
Fonagy P., Gergely G., Jurist E., Target M. (2002), Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of 
the Self. New York: Other Press.
Fox N., Davidson R.A. (1987), Electroencephalogram Asymmetry in Response to the Approach of a Stranger 
and Maternal Separation in 10-month-old Infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 233–240.
Gollwitzer P.M. (1999), Implementation Intentions: Strong Effects of Simple Plans. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 73, 186–197.
Goodale M.A., Milner A.D. (1992), Separate Visual Pathways for Perception and Action. Trends in Neuro-
science, 15, 20–25.
Higgins E.T. (1987), Self-discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect. Psychological Review, 94,
319–340.
Hiroto D.W., Seligman M.E.P. (1975), Generality of Learned Helplessness in Man. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 31, 311–327.
Hollon S.D., Beck A. (2005), Cognitive and Cognitive Behavioral Therapy [in:] M.J. Lambert (ed.), Bergin 
and Garfi eld`s Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change, 447–491. New York: Wiley.
Kanfer F.H. (1970), Self-regulation: Research, Issues, and Speculations [in:] C. Neuringer, J.L. Michael 
(eds.), Behavior Modifi cation in Clinical Psychology, 178–220. New York: Appleton.
Kazén M., Baumann N., Twenhöfel J., Kuhl J. (2011), Body-image Distortion in Patients with Anorexia
Nervosa as a Function of Left-hemispheric Activation and Negative Self-relevant Words. Unpublished pa-
per. University of Osnabrück, Germany.
Kazén M., Kuhl J. (2005), Intention Memory and Achievement Motivation: Volitional Facilitation and In-
hibition as a Function of Affective Contents of Need-related Stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 89, 426–448.
KazénM., Kuhl J. (2011), Bereichsspezifi sche Diskrepanzen Zwischen Impliziten und Expliziten Motiven 
und Auswirkungen auf das Wohlbefi nden [Domain-specifi c Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explic-
it Motives and their Impact on Well-being]. Invited lecture at 31th German Conference on Motivation, 
Munich, July, 25–26, 2011.
Kimura D. (2011), From Ear to Brain. Brain and Cognition, doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2010.11.009
Kircher T.T.J., Brammer M., Bullmore E., Simmons A., Bartels M., David A.S. (2002), The Neural Correlates 
of Intentional and Incidental Self Processing. Neuropsychologia, 40, 683–692.
Kuhl J. (1981), Motivational and Functional Helplessness: The Moderating Effect of Action vs. State Orien-
tation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 155–170.
Kuhl J. (2000), A Functional-design Approach to Motivation and Self-regulation: The Dynamics of Person-
ality Systems Interactions [in:] M. Boekaerts, P.R. Pintrich, M. Zeidner (eds.), Handbook of Self-Regula-
tion, 111–169. San Diego: Academic Press.
Kuhl J. (2001), Motivation und Persönlichkeit: Interaktionen psychischer Systeme [Motivation and Personal-
ity: Architectures of Mood and Mind]. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Kuhl J. (2007), Der Sinn und das Selbst: Experimentelle Bestätigung logotherapeutischer Prinzipien. [Mean-
ing and Self: Experimental Validation of Principles of Logotherapy]. Existenzanalyse, 15, 22–41.
Kuhl J., Kazén M. (1994), Self-discrimination and Memory: State Orientation and False Self-ascription of 
Assigned Activities. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 1103–1115.
Kuhl J., Kazén M. (1999), Volitional Facilitation of Diffi cult Intentions: Joint Activation of Intention Memo-
ry and Positive Affect Removes Stroop Interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 
382–399.
Kuhl J., Kazén M., Koole S.L. (2006), Putting Self-regulation Theory into Practice: A User’s Manual. Applied 
Psychology: An International Review, 55, 408–418.
30 Julius Kuhl
Kuhl J., Keller H. (2008), Affect-regulation, Self-development and Parenting: A Functional-Design Approach 
to Cross-cultural Differences [in:]  R. Sorrentino, S. Yamaguchi (Eds.), The Handbook of Motivation and 
Cognition across Cultures, 19–47. New York, NY: Elsevier.
Kuhl J., Koole S. (2008), The Functional Architecture of Approach and Avoidance Motivation [in:] A. Elliot 
(Ed.), The Handbook of Approach and Avoidance Motivation, 535–553. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kuhl J., Künne T., Aufhammer F. (2011), Wer Sich Angenommen Fühlt, Lernt Besser: Begabungsförderung 
und Selbstkompetenzen [Loved Children Learn Better: Ability Development Requires Self-competen-
cies] [in:] J. Kuhl S. Müller-Using, C. Solzbacher, W. Warnecke (Eds.), Bildung durch Beziehung. Selb-
stkompetenz stärken – Begabungen entfalten [Education and Communion: Boosting Self-competencies – 
Unfolding Talents]. Freiburg: Herder.
Lang P.J. (1995), The Emotion Probe: Studies of Motivation and Attention. American Psychologist, 50,
372–385.
Levesque J., Fanny E., Joanett Y., Paquette V., Mensour B., Beaudouin G., Leroux J.-M., Borugouin P., Beau-
regard M. (2003), Neural Circuitry Underlying Voluntary Suppression of Sadness. Biological Psychia-
try, 53, 502–510.
Lewin K. (1936), Principles of Topological Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Lewinsohn P.M., Steinmetz J.L., Larson D.W., Franklin J. (1981), Depression-related Cognitions: Antecedent 
or Consequence? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 40, 213–219.
Linehan M.M. (1993), Skills Training Manual for Treating Bor-derline Personality Disorder. New York: 
Guilford Press.
Locke E.A., Latham G.P. (1990), A Theory of Goal Setting and Task Performance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.
MacDonald K. (1992), Warmth as a Developmental Construct: An Evolutionary Analysis. Child Develop-
ment, 63, 753–773.
McCrae R.R., Costa P.T. (1987), Validation of the Five-factor Model of Personality across Instruments and 
Observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 81–90.
Meaney M., Aitken D., van Berkel C., Bhatnagar S., Sapolsky R. (1988), Effect of Neonatal Handling on 
Age-related Impairments Associated with the Hippocampus. Science, 239, 766–768.
Molnar-Szakacs I., Uddin L.Q., Iacoboni M. (2005), Right-hemisphere Motor Facilitation by Self-descriptive 
Personality-trait Words. European Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 2000–2006.
Oettingen G., Pak H.J., Schnetter K. (2001), Self-regulation of Goal-setting: Turning Free Fantasies about the 
Future into Binding Goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 736–753.
Pruessner J.C., Baldwin M.W., Dedovic K., Renwick R., Mahani N.K., Lord C., Meaney M., Lupien S. 
(2005), Self-esteem, Locus of Control, Hippocampal Volume, and Crtisol Regulation in Young and Old 
Adulthood. NeuroImage, 28, 815–826. 
Quirin M., Koole S.L., Baumann N., Kazén M., Kuhl J. (2009), You Can’t Always Remember What You 
Want: The Role of Cortisol in Self-ascription of Assigned Goals. Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 
1026–1032.
Radke S., Nüsser C., Erk S., Kuhl J., Walter H. (2008), The Contribution of Achievement Motivation to 
Stroop Interference: An Event-related fMRI Study. Poster presented at the International Congress of
Psychology, Berlin, Germany.
Renger S. (2009), Begabungsausschöpfung-Persönlichkeitsentwicklung durch Begabungsförderung [Actu-
alizing Latent Talents: Self-development through Competence-oriented Support]. Unpublished Disserta-
tion. Universität Osnabrück.
Ritz-Schulte G., Schmidt P., Kuhl J. (2008), Persönlichkeitsorientierte Psychotherapie [Person-oriented
Psychotherapy]. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Rogers C.R. (1961), On Becoming a person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton
Miffl in.
Rotenberg V.S. (2004), The Peculiarity of the Right-hemisphere Function in Depression: Solving the
Paradoxes. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology & Biological Psychiatry, 28, 1–13.
31Adaptive and Maladaptive Pathways of Self-Development: Mental Health and Interactions…
Ryan R.M., Deci E.L., Grolnick W.S., La Guardia J.G., Cicchetti D. (2006), The Signifi cance of Autonomy 
and Autonomy Support in Psychological Development and Psychopathology. Developmental Psychopa-
thology [in:] D.J. Cohen (ed.), Developmental Psychopathology, Vol 1: Theory and Method (2nd ed.), 
795–849. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Sapolsky R.M. (1992), Stress, the Aging Brain, and the Mechanism of Neuron Death. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Schmajuk N.A., DiCarlo J.J. (1992), Stimulus Confi guration, Classical Conditioning, and Hippocampal 
Function. Psychological Review, 99, 268–305.
Smeets M.A.M., Kosslyn S.M (2001), Hemispheric Differences in Body Image in Anorexia Nervosa. Inter-
national Journal of Eating Disorders, 29. 409–416. 
Sporns O., Chialvo D.R., Kaiser M., Hilgetag C.C. (2004), Organization, Development and Function of Com-
plex Brain Networks. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 418–425.
Squire L.R. (1992), Memory and the Hippocampus: A Synthesis from Findings with Rats, Monkeys, and
Humans. Psychological Review, 99, 195–231.
Storch M., Kuhl J. (2011), Die Kraft aus dem Selbst: Sieben PsychoGyms für das Unbewusste [The Power of 
Self: Seven Mental Gyms for the Unconscious]. Bern: Huber.
Toga A.W., Thompson P.M. (2003), Mapping Brain Asymmetry. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 37–48.
Völker S., Schwer C. (2011), Die Bindungs-Explorations-Balance im Kita-Alltag [The Balance between
Attachment and Exploration in Nursery School] [in:] J. Kuhl, S. Müller-Using, C. Solzbacher, W. War-
necke (eds.): Bildung durch Beziehung. Selbstkompetenz stärken – Begabungen entfalten [Education and 
communion: Boosting self-competencies – Unfolding talents]. Freiburg: Herder.
Vygotsky L.S. (1978), Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
Wellman H.M., Cross D., Watson J. (2001), A Meta-analysis of Theory of Mind Development: The Truth 
about False Belief. Child Development, 72, 655–684.
Wimmer H., Perner J. (1983), Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong
Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception. Cognition, 13, 103–128.
Wittling W. (1990), Psychophysiological Correlates of Human Brain Asymmetry: Blood Pressure Changes 
During Lateralized Presentation of an Emotionally Laden Film. Neuropsychologia, 28, 457–470.
Wojdyło K. (2010), Workaholism. A Cognitive Perspective. Warszawa: Difi n.
